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Introduction: 
In the last decade, peer-to-peer (P2P) networking systems have gained in popularity. The 
novelty of these systems is such that the traditional client-server network is replaced by a 
decentralized network where peers play the part of both client and server. Networks have 
been proposed and implemented that distribute both data files and processing cycles. P2P 
networks based on file sharing have been highly successful, and networks such as 
Gnutella and Kazaa allow millions of users to share files. 
Backup systems have traditionally been a localized task requiring specific backup 
hardware and administration. New desktop computers purchased these days will include a 
multi-gigabyte drive, and studies suggest that the majority of disc space often remains 
underused. Several research projects have proposed that, instead of purchasing extra 
hardware or leasing online disc space, these unused gigabytes of space could be utilized 
in order to store backup data within a collaborating group of networked peers.  
These research papers share some of the same features such as utilization of structured 
overlay networks, minimal use of centralized server authorities, and the use of 
cryptographic functions for security and identity. The purpose of this paper will be to 
standardize on that functionality most required by a P2P backup scheme, and among this 
determine what has and what has not yet been successfully worked out within the 
previous research. Also, emerging technologies and practices pose problems that did not 
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exist at the time of the original papers, and the current feasibility of a successful P2P 
backup network will be analyzed in light of these developments. 
Previous Work and Motivation: 
 
The most notable P2P backup research projects include Pstore [1], PeerStore [2], Pastiche 
[3], and Cooperative Internet Backup Scheme [4], and among these exist is a large 
amount of agreement as to which functionality is required, and how to implement it. A 
standard motivating factor given by the projects is utilization of excess hard drive space 
that most pcs currently have. An oft-cited study claims to have found that most hard 
drives in standard pcs are extremely under-utilized [5]. Throughout the text, one should 
assume that the main goals of the projects include data reliability, security, and good 
citizenship among the network peers. Unused hard drive space located on general desktop 
pcs is the commodity of which the projects attempts to take advantage.  
A typical scenario for a user of a general P2P backup system would be as follows: backup 
software is installed on a host pc. Either a whole file system (Pastiche) or individual files 
are marked for backup. Files are broken up into ‘chunks,’ perhaps encrypted for privacy, 
and inserted into the network. The insertion mechanism varies, but it is assumed that 
some quantity of peers that corresponds to the desired replication factor of each chunk 
agrees to store the chunk on its local hard drive. The peer making the request for storage 
will be referred to as the requestor, while the node who agrees to store the data on its 
hard drive will be known as the responder. Changes to files marked for backups are 
monitored and the difference of the files is again inserted into the network (though not 
necessarily to the same responders as the previous data chunks). The responders that 
agree to share their excess storage space should in return be allowed to utilize a 
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proportionate amount of storage space on the network, either with the exact requestors for 
whom it is storing data or completely different nodes depending on the individual 
projects; the important factor is that a fair system is implemented in order to avoid free 
riders. Later, when a requestor wishes to ‘restore’ some data, appropriate responders are 
found for all of the chunks that are required for the file, the chunks are retrieved and 
verified for consistency, and the file is decrypted and restored. Finally, peers should be 
able to delete data from the responders in order to minimize their network storage usage, 
though only authorized users should be able to delete (and retrieve) data from another 
network peer. Thus, the typical high-level commands employed by the projects include 
insert, retrieve, delete, and perhaps increment/update depending on the specific 
implementation.  
Besides storing just the raw data itself, each of the implementations utilizes some 
quantity of metadata that is created for one or more data chunks stored on the network. 
The metadata is provided for functionality such as version control, encryption, 
identification, storage location, etc. In other words, information is recorded in order to 
facilitate the retrieval of some file that is divided up into encrypted chunks and stored on 
numerous nodes throughout the network. This ‘metadata’ itself needs to be inserted into 
the network in anticipation of the event that a backup is required from some node whose 
hard drive with original data and metadata has failed. 
Traditional network computing was based upon the client-server architecture. For 
example, a web browser contacts the web server, an ftp client obtains files from the ftp 
server, etc. In a peer-to-peer network, however, a node will play the parts of both client 
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and server; a ‘true’ P2P network eschews the use of centralized servers for the following 
reasons: 
1. The crash of specific nodes being used as central servers can be a leading point of 
failure for the whole network.  
2. Networks that rely on central server(s) do not scale well. In other words, unless 
the server to client ratio is kept at a constant proportion, the server(s) will quickly 
become a bottleneck for a growing network. 
A large amount of research on P2P networks has focused on how to decentralize 
functionality usually provided by a central server: authentication, lookup services, 
logging, resource brokering, etc. It is almost always easier to implement new 
functionality with the help of dedicated central servers that the peer nodes can contact. 
With regard to the amount of server centralization among P2P networks, three varying 
models have formed: centralized, decentralized, and hybrid. 
Centralized: 
Napster was a file-sharing application that brought peer-to-peer computing into the 
mainstream in the late 90’s. In the Napster network, each client computer would create a 
list of the files it was willing to share and would upload the list to a central indexing 
server. Other clients would then query the index server for files and would be given the 
addresses of those client nodes at which the files were located. Ultimately, this 
centralized model did fail when the servers went down - in the case of Napster via court 
orders due to copyright violations. 
Decentralized 
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The original Gnutella network was an example of a purely decentralized network. The 
network contained absolutely no central servers, and the network was not vulnerable to 
failure in the event of individual servers going down. Each node in the network would 
open a connection to several other nodes. A query for a file would then be propagated 
throughout the network through every other connecting node; the query would stop only 
after some time-to-live value had been surpassed. While this method was safe from 
sudden failure, the query mechanism did not scale well as the number of nodes increased. 
Furthermore, there was no guarantee that queries would find a successful match if the 
matching node was located at a distance that surpassed the ttl value. 
Hybrid 
The third approach is known as a hybrid or supernode network and has been utilized by 
networks such as Kazaa and more recent versions of Gnutella. Like a decentralized 
approach, each node makes a connection with several other nodes - the network lacks a 
central query server. However, nodes with a high availability of bandwidth and/or 
computer power are designated as supernodes, and queries are only propagated among 
these special nodes. 
As mentioned, a decentralized network is less prone to failure in the event any other peer 
goes down. However, without a centralized server, functionality such as authentication 
and quota management becomes complex. It should be noted that clients in a backup 
network are not interested in avoiding the ‘copyright police’ or obtaining anonymous 
publishing capabilities. Instead, the important factors are network fairness, secure and 
retrievable data, and ease of finding nodes with which to share space with. 
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Of the mentioned P2P backup projects, the only admitted utilization of central server(s) is 
Cooperative Internet Backup Scheme [4] which employs a ‘simple central server to keep 
track of the computers in the system and their partner needs.’ Unfortunately, none of the 
projects have yet to design a decentralized network that is resistant to malicious, 
conspiring, and/or unfair nodes.  
Does this mean that it is worth investigating the incorporation of central servers for 
specific functionality? For example, a network may chose to use a central certificate 
authority to provide the required level of authentication and/or identity management, or 
perhaps a brokerage service for fair sharing of disc space.  While the failure of the 
certificate authority would temporarily cease issuance of encryption keys and identities to 
new nodes wishing to join the network, it does not necessarily preclude the continued 
operation of the rest of the backup network. The lack of any successful commercial or 
open-source peer-to-peer backup solutions could be a strong indication that completely 
decentralized backup networks may not be possible at this time. A solution that utilizes 
central servers for specific functionality may be more realistic for now. 
Structured Versus Unstructured  
Peer-to-peer networks may further be categorized as structured or unstructured. A 
structured network facilitates a logical mapping between the node ids and the content that 
is distributed on the network. Research projects such as Chord and CAN have designed 
varying networks based on distributed hash tables (DHT). A DHT assumes that a key-
space is created which is able to be mapped to specific nodes; for instance, a protocol can 
declare its key-space as consisting of all integers able to be represented by thirty-two bits. 
Each node within the network then becomes responsible for holding onto the data 
 6
represented by a subset of the keys. The main advantage is that given the key that 
corresponds to some data file, the node containing the data can be found with O(Log N)  
(N is the number of nodes in the network; the logarithmic base varies) queries while still 
allowing the network to retain a decentralized approach to querying.  Furthermore, each 
node need only store the routing information for a small subset of the nodes on the 
network, and the protocols attempt to provide adaptability as nodes continuously join and 
leave the network. These protocols are advantageous in situations where a key of some 
file is obtained from some other source. For instance, one might publish on the web the 
key to a specific document or music file. The key would be queried and some node 
carrying this file could be found in O (Log N) time. 
Pastiche employs the Pastry overlay network to route file queries to nodes. The use of a 
structured network is compatible with Pastiche’s goal of decentralization (no central 
servers required). Furthermore, Pastiche is based on complete hard drive images, which 
includes a high percentage of operating system and application file overlap among nodes. 
Upon joining the backup network, a client’s hard drive would be scanned and the files 
indexed. Along with the user’s unique files (documents, pictures, etc), there would also 
be operating system files common to all other pcs; using an MS Windows® based 
installation for example, solitaire.exe, explorer.exe, and other common files would be 
indexed. Assuming other Windows based pcs had already joined the network, Pastiche 
should detect that these files are already stored on the network, and a specific upload of 
these redundant OS files would not be required. 
Pstore [1] and PeerStore [2] both employ Chord as the routing backend. Pstore makes no 
difference between the actual data and metadata that is stored on the network, while 
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PeerStore cleverly utilizes Chord for only the metadata itself, which is much smaller than 
the raw backup data. This is because the current structured networks require that a node 
that is leaving the network (for instance, powering off, losing its connection to the 
network, etc) is required to dump its data store onto whichever node is taking over its 
position in the hash table. For example, if some node is currently holding all of the data 
for some subset of the key-space, it would have to upload its whole data store to some 
other node each and every time it went offline. Likewise, a node joining the network 
would have to download some subset of the key-space upon each network join. 
Considering that all of these networks are based upon a highly transient and unstable 
collection of pcs, and also that data backups imply gigabytes of data, the use of structured 
networks for the data itself is impractical in any network that places nodes outside a 
single high-speed local network.  
As mentioned, the problem of finding some host that holds a file based on some 
published key is not inherent to personal backups based on a user’s unique files: the keys 
based on these files should not ever be needed by anyone other than the original peer. 
Instead, a client wishing to backup its data must find the ip address and port number of 
other nodes willing to store this data. The actual contents of the data are irrelevant and in 
fact should not even be readable by the storing agent. The requesting node uploads data 
to the storing node and need only remember the unique id of the storing node. 
Integrity 
 
In a peer-to-peer backup system, requestor peers must be able to insure that their data has 
not been modified in the time between the initial store and later retrieval. The projects 
described so far generally use signed cryptographic hashes of the data and store it as 
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metadata. Upon retrieval of the data, the signed hash is compared to the hash of the 
downloaded data. 
Besides insuring file integrity at the time of retrieval, there must exist some way for the 
requestor peer to confirm that the responder peers continue to store an accurate copy of 
the original uploaded data. For example, malicious responder nodes could agree to store 
data in order to gain a proportionate amount of storage on the requestor node (assuming a 
fair quota mechanism were in place), only to discard the data soon afterwards. Even if the 
network is assumed to not contain malicious peers, there is always the real opportunity of 
data loss on an honest peer. 
The majority of the research projects address this issue by using a ‘challenge’ command. 
The idea is that the requestors will randomly send a challenge request to those nodes who 
have agreed to store its data. The most straightforward way would be for the responder to 
return a full copy of the data, although this would create unnecessary bandwidth costs. A 
better solution is offered by Peerstore: essentially, the requestor sends a challenge 
command to the responder along with a randomly generated seed value that is appended 
to the data being challenged. An agreed upon series of hashes is done, and only the final 
hash value needs to be returned in order to prove data integrity. Another method could 
simply send a challenge requesting a standard hash be done at some position on a 
specified number of bytes among the data.  
While the challenge scheme is generally agreed upon as being an effective method of 
keeping peers honest, there is no consensus on how to deal with nodes that fail the 
challenges. For example, a challenged peer may send the wrong hash if the data has not 
been stored correctly, or may not even be able to answer a challenge due to being 
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powered off or not connected to the network. Several of the schemes rely upon 
‘symmetric’ data trading. For example, node A will only share its excess space to node B 
if node B agrees to accept a proportionate amount of its space to node A. This is in 
contrast to non-symmetric schemes that might use micropayments or reputation schemes 
to only insure that nodes share proportionate amounts of space on the network as a whole. 
When two nodes are sharing each others’ data, the responder that fails the challenge can 
be directly punished by the node that actually holds the responder’s data. The best 
method employed seems to be to drop the responder’s data at an exponentially increasing 
probabilistic rate for each failed challenge.  
Unfortunately, there are several downsides to the challenge method. First, what happens 
when an honest node is unable to respond to challenges due to its hard drive failing? The 
whole point of the network is to insure the ability to backup data after node failures -- the 
failed node obviously cannot respond to challenge requests, thus leading to its backup 
data dropped by the punishing peers. One proposed solution to this is the introduction of 
a grace period – a specified amount of time that a node may fail challenges before data is 
actually dropped from the network. However, this creates a race for the owner of the 
failed node to get back online before the grace period expires. This is hardly an 
appropriate requirement of a backup system that is reliable and easy to administer.  
The grace period also creates a large hole to be exploited by malicious clients. If there is 
no central identity or reputation system in place, malicious nodes could obtain large 
amounts of storage space while ignoring challenges during the grace period. Just before 
the grace period was to expire, the node would move all of its data to other nodes and 
obtain a fresh grace period. Cooperative Internet Backup [4] admits this problem and 
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proposes that peers wishing to join the backup network ‘prepay’ before being given the 
right to store data. According to the paper, ‘backup service is not available for the first 3 
weeks after joining the system, for up to 2 weeks after a restoration, and additional 
backup space takes 3 weeks to become available (new partners are needed).’ 
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely a user would be inclined to join any service with such 
restrictions in place. 
One last problem associated with the use of challenges based on the stored data (or 
hashes of the data) is the requirement that the challenging node keep a copy of the data in 
order to generate the challenges.  
 Authentication and Identification: 
Because any client should symmetrically encrypt any data it wishes to keep private 
before it is stored on the network, authentication is not really required for data retrieval 
itself. However, deleting data stored on nodes should only be allowed by the client that 
originally stored the data. Furthermore, a P2P backup network will eventually want to 
include some sort of quota or reputation mechanism. In other words, the network should 
have an enforceable policy that the amount of data any single client is able to store 
throughout the network is proportional to the amount of data that same client is willing to 
store for other peers. Without a standard method of authentication and identification, 
there is no way to guarantee the amount of data each client is willing to store and also the 
aggregate amount of space each client is utilizing on the network. 
It is generally accepted that without a central identity manager, a network will always be 
vulnerable to ‘Sybil attacks,’ characterized by malicious peers' continuous change 
identity in order to take advantage of some weakness in the network. None of the 
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previously mentioned projects use any sort of identity manager. A straightforward 
implementation to authenticate and control identity would employ a certificate authority 
with a public / private key pair. The certificate authority’s public key would be 
distributed to all clients wishing to join the network. If the certificate authority 
determines that the peer is allowed to join the network, for example after agreeing to 
share some quantity of space, another private and public key pair would be created for the 
new node. Furthermore, a certificate would be generated that includes the identity and 
public key of the new node, and the certificate would be signed by the certificate 
authority’s private key. All communications between peers would have to include the 
certificates of each of the peers, which could then be verified using the public key of the 
certificate authority. 
Without a centralized authority, authentication can still be provided for some functions, 
for example deletion of data is permitted to only that peer that originally requested the 
data be stored. Unfortunately, the traditional problem of poor scalability arises as each 
pair of communicating nodes requires a separate agreed upon key. 
Privacy 
 
In contrast to peer-to-peer networks which provide file distribution and sharing 
functionality, the data stored on responders should not be readable or modifiable by 
anyone other than the requestor itself. Using a large-enough private key, there is no 
reason to fear storing important data on unknown nodes. Problems arise, however, when 
networks attempt to minimize resources by ‘sharing’ common data. For example, 
Pastiche assumes that complete disc images will be created and stored on the backup 
network. Any pcs based on the same operating system and/or using similar applications 
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will have huge amounts of redundant data consisting of OS specific libraries, executable 
programs, templates, etc. Using structured overlay networks without encryption, all of 
these similar files would hash to the same key value, and unnecessary bandwidth and 
storage space could be avoided if the redundant data blocks were able to be recognized. 
However, if data is encrypted using unique keys and varying encryption algorithms, it 
would at first appear that privacy and data sharing are mutually exclusive.  
The solution that previous projects have employed is convergent encryption. Essentially, 
a strong cryptographic hash is taken on the data. This hash is then used as the key to 
encrypt the data. Thus, if standard methods are used to generate the lookup key on any 
data to be inserted into the structured network, redundant byte patterns would be 
discovered, and any node that originally owned the data and was able to generate the hash 
that was used as the actual encryption key would then be able to decrypt the data if 
needed.  
It should be noted that sharing of data complicates the delete commands as more than one 
node may now depend on one specific file for its backups. PStore attaches ownership tags 
corresponding to each peer that shares each data block. The ownership tag itself is 
actually deleted for each delete command, and the data itself is removed only when the 
ownership tag count reaches zero.   
Problems 
Though a large amount of research has already been invested in P2P backup networks, a 
successful backup application has yet to be found outside of academia. The reasons can 
be generalized as follows: 
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1. Reliable backups preclude the use of unreliable peers over the internet. Even with 
strong cryptographic encryption and the use of authentication authorities, it is 
extremely unlikely that large corporate or governmental agencies would consider 
using a backup scheme that stores data on uncontrolled personal computers located on 
the internet. In order to create a reliable backup network, central servers providing 
authentication, identity management, fair usage enforcement, etc are required. 
Unfortunately, the use of central servers is antagonistic to the idea of a decentralized 
peer-to-peer network. In other words, if the network must rely on central servers, the 
servers might as well be used to backup the data itself. 
2. Competition in the form of one-touch backup drives and online storage is growing. 
Earlier papers proposing peer-to-peer backup schemes frequently list the high cost of 
traditional online backup storage as a motivating factor. For instance A Cooperative 
Internet Backup Scheme [4] stated ‘a typical fee today to backup one gigabyte of data 
is fifty US dollars a month.’ The original Pastiche paper used a ratio of ‘8 GB on a 
single machine for $30 per month’ [3].  In contrast, the recently launched Amazon S3 
(Simple Storage Service) offers developers a reliable storage backend with no startup 
fee and $0.15 per GB/month of storage used with $0.20 per GB of data transferred. 
Personal USB drives have been decreasing in price and increasing in ease of use. For 
example, a current Maxtor One-Touch external backup drives promise reliable 
personal backups with only the push of one button, and the price per gigabyte is less 
than $1.00. Installation is no more complicated than plugging in the drive via a USB 
or firewire cable and perhaps following a simple wizard.  
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3. Small ‘trustful’ networks are usually not physically diverse and would not support 
symmetric trading. Many of the complexities associated with authentication and 
resource sharing can be ignored if the network is small and all peers can be trusted. 
This could be beneficial if the main prerogative was saving on dedicated backup 
hardware such as expensive tape drive systems or individual USB backup drives for 
multiple machines. However, there are two problems associated with small networks 
with limited nodes. First, the fewer the number of nodes on the network, the harder it 
will be to find willing trading partners. For example, those projects that use 
symmetric trading assume that there will always be peers available to make trades. 
For example, Cooperative Internet Backup Scheme [4] states that the system ‘should 
have many [members] … preferably more than ten thousand’ in order to work well. 
This requirement would exclude small and trustworthy networks that would most 
benefit from a P2P backup network. Second, the peers of small networks would likely 
be vulnerable to geographically localized catastrophes, such as fires and floods. 
4. Increased energy prices and advanced power management techniques are antagonistic 
to a backup scheme requiring the use of multiple machines with reliable uptimes.   
The probability of some file being available at some time is a function of both the 
redundancy factor and the estimated uptime of the peer machines. The standard study 
[6] used to estimate desktop uptime was done in 1999 on machines running Windows 
NT. Since 1999, the price of crude oil, which can be used as rough estimate of 
general energy costs, has more than tripled. Furthermore, power management 
techniques have greatly improved. The two biggest power consumers on a general 
desktop computer are the display and the hard drive, and power management 
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techniques seek to both minimize use of the monitor and reduce hard drive spin. 
Minimizing power consumed by the hard drive is averse to a P2P backup scheme. 
The trend in OS design favors more aggressive energy savings defaults, such as the 
inability of user mode applications to ‘veto’ power downs and default settings that 
attempt to maximize power savings [7]. 
Implementation 
 
A small implementation was developed in order to gain experience with the relevant P2P 
and backup concepts. All code was written in Python and tested on a single pc running 
Fedora Core version 5. 
Network Protocol: 
 
The network communication uses standard TCP/IP. However, because IP addresses are 
not static, each client on the network must instead be given a verifiable unique id. In the 
prototype, each client id is actually just the Linux user name which is assured to be 
unique on a single machine. The actual protocol employed is loosely based on HTTP 
version 1.0. All communications are synchronous - a client sends a single request and 
expects to receive a single response for each single TCP connection.  
A command line is sent followed by a series of header lines followed by an optional 
body. Among peers uploading and downloading data, three commands are currently 
accepted: Put, Get, and Delete. Each command must be followed by a key that associates 
the data to be acted upon. The command line must be represented in printable ASCII 
characters only and is followed by ASCII characters 13 and 10 (carriage return and 
linefeed). 
Put|Get|Delete key\r\n 
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Within the response, the command line is basically an echo of the request along with a 
numeric response code that indicates success or failure. Currently a response code of 200 
signifies success while a 500 indicates a generic error, which may include inability to 
authenticate, malformed requests, missing headers, etc. 
A header is a key-value pair separated by a colon and space. Like the command, each 
header line is followed by the carriage return and linefeed characters. Similarly, both the 
key and value must be encoded in printable ASCII characters. Headers so far include the 
following:  
1. client: the unique id of the client (currently just the Linux username) 
2. content-length: the number of bytes of the accompanying body 
3. public_key: base64 encoded version of a RSA public key 
4. cert: username and public key digitally signed by the master private key 
5. authline: timestamp echo of the two ids of the communicating clients along with 
the command 
6. authsign: digital signature of the authline header 
The use of headers allows for more functionality to be easily added to the protocol 
without having to significantly change the networking code. The final header is separated 
from the optional body by another carriage return/line feed pair. Both a Put request and a 
Get response will contain a content-length header and body containing the requested data.  
Lookup 
 
This Project 
 This project is more concerned with strong security, reliability, and fair use than with the 
advantages obtained using a decentralized approach. Consequently, a lookup server will 
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be employed that both provides client id to IP/Port translation and also provides a service 
for matching clients looking for storage space to clients offering to share space. Thus, 
there are two IP addressing schemes. In other words, an IP address of some node may 
vary in time. Instead of IP based identification, unique ids are provided to each node that 
joins the network, and a central server is employed to map varying IP and port numbers 
to client ids using a simple heartbeat mechanism. Using the same authentication and 
verification schemes as described below, clients periodically send a heartbeat signal to 
the id server giving out its IP and port to be used by other clients. When another client 
wishes to communicate with some node based on some unique client id, the id server is 
queried. The location of the id server itself must be provided to the client software via 
configuration files, hard coding, or some other bootstrapping method. Currently, the 
lookup server is defined as the user nameserver at a standard port. 
The exact message exchange is as follows: All peer nodes are required to periodically 
send out a synchronous  heartbeat signal to the name server. The exact protocol uses the 
same syntax as all other network messages in the project (see Network Protocol), 
including a command line and a series of headers. The command sent is heartbeat xxx\r\n 
where heartbeat is the command word and xxx is the key that is not used and can be 
discarded by the nameserver. Authentication headers must be included in order to verify 
the client’s identification. Also, the headers must include the IP address and port number, 
for instance, IP: x.x.x.x\r\n and port: xx\r\n where the IP address is assumed to be in 
dotted decimal notation and the port as a simple integer value. A successfully 
authenticated heartbeat will be responded with an echo heartbeat xxx 200\r\n, and again 
the xxx key value can be ignored. Unsuccessful heartbeats receive a 500 error reply. The 
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nameserver will keep a list of available storage peers. A peer will be removed from the 
list of available name servers after some configurable time has passed without a 
successful heartbeat having been sent. 
The nameserver itself is queried using the command line hostrequest xx\r\n, where 
hostrequest is the command and xx is a key value that again is unused and can be 
discarded. As with all other messages, appropriate authentication headers must be 
included in order to verify the client’s identification. A successful reply will include an 
echo of the command followed by a 200. Furthermore, within the headers will be a hosts: 
id:ip:port\nid:ip:port\n…\r\n where each single newline character separates a peer 
identified by its id, IP address, and port number. 
A peer must keep track of which peers it has stored its backups on; As mentioned, IP 
addresses may vary, and a peer should associate other peers using ids. To retrieve the 
IP/port address of some host, the command request sent to the name server is lookup 
xx\r\n where lookup is the command and xx is the unique id of the peer whose IP/port is 
being requested. If the peer whose IP is being lookup up had not successfully sent a 
heartbeat in the given amount of time and has been expired from the nameserver, a 500 
error code is returned. A successful response is indicated by a lookup xx 200\r\n along 
with ip and port headers. 
Backups 
The current method of backups is incremental and is based upon the standard UNIX diff 
and patch commands. A user will initially create a bstore object which is unique to each 
client; its state information is stored under the user's home directory under the ~/bstore/ 
directory. At the moment, a user will give the client a file to associate with a given key 
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name. The client will copy the file to its directory and also find other nodes on the 
network willing to store the file. The data is encrypted and a hash of the data is created in 
order to insure file integrity if and when the data is later retrieved. This key value cannot 
be used again until the key is deleted from the system. Later, the file may be modified, 
and the user may wish to backup the more up-to-date version of the file. The new data 
file is then submitted to the bstore object using the same key. Using the standard UNIX 
utility diff, a file containing the data and instructions necessary to convert the updated file 
to the initial file is created. This data is then appended to the original bfile in the form of 
an additional bversion. A complete copy of the most up-to-date version of the file is 
always kept stored on the client to insure the ability to always create a new version of the 
file. 
 
To retrieve a specific version of the file, a reverse process is instantiated. For example, if 
some file had been created and then modified 5 different times, there would be six 
versions of the file. The most up-to-date version (#6) would be contained on the client 
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machine and would itself be returned if the last version was requested. If, for example, 
version #3 (the second modified version of the file) were to be requested, all of the diff 
files created from version #3 through version #5 would have to be downloaded in reverse 
order and successfully applied using the patch utility  in order to finally obtain the file as 
it appeared at the time of version #3.  
A significant problem with this method is the requirement that all versions that are 
chronologically located between the requested version and the latest version must be 
obtained in order to recreate the requested version. For instance, in the previous example, 
if the client were unsuccessful in obtaining the diff data known as version #4, there would 
be no way to obtain any version of the file below and including version #4 itself. 
To delete a file, each copy of each version must be located on the network and the delete 
command applied to the specific version. Using the previous example, the original file 
along with all five of the diff files must be found and deleted from the network. In order 
to provide redundancy, each diff version should be stored on more than one host. 
Consequently, to successfully delete a file, the number of required delete commands will 
be the number of versions multiplied by the redundancy factor of each file. If a quota or 
credit policy is in effect, it is to the client's advantage to make sure to successfully delete 
each and every version of the file that it has stored on the network. Because nodes may 
periodically be unavailable, such as when the delete command is initiated, the project 
proposes a deletion manager that periodically searches for nodes containing data that 
should be deleted but have never been successfully contacted. This could be implemented 
using a simple daemon process.      
Message Integrity 
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It is essential that a peer be able to insure that the data it has backed up on network peers 
is not modified in any way. Like the privacy issue, this functionality is easily obtained 
using message digests, and the exact method used by each client can be unique and 
independent to the methods chosen by any other clients. This project uses the following 
implementation: For each data object that is stored on the network, a client will generate 
a hex-based hash using the standard sha python module. When a message is retrieved 
from a peer, the same hash is computed and compared with the original. 
Centralized Authentication: 
As utilization of unused storage-space is the goal of the project, a centralized 
authentication server is the better choice. This way, it is much more straightforward to 
authenticate numerous clients using an approach similar to the SSL / TLS standard using 
certificates. The actual implementation works as follows: A public/private RSA key pair 
known as main_public.key and main_private.key is created for some entity that will stand 
in as the certificate authority. Main_private.key is never divulged, while main_public.key 
is given out to every peer joining the network. Within the network, every legitimate client 
will have a unique id along with an associated public/private RSA key pair known as 
client_x_private.key and client_x_public.key. Along with the client's unique id and 
corresponding key pair, the CA will generate for each client a certificate. The certificate 
is created by signing the client's unique id and public key using main_public.key. 
Any client wishing to authenticate with its peers must include its unique client id, public 
key, and certificate. Any client sending a verifiable certificate can be trusted as long as 
the certificate authority itself can be trusted. Although it is possible for a client to give 
out its certificate along with its secret private key, this would only allow malicious clients 
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to impersonate that client who divulged its private key. Once the specific client id is 
verified to be associated with the appropriate key pair digital signatures can be used to 
verify the actual requests. Two more headers must be included within each 
request/response.  
 authline:   From Command To Timestamp 
 authsign: Signed(Authline) 
In the authline header, From is the requesting client id, Command is the command 
(Put,Get, Delete, etc), To is the receiving client id, and Timestamp is the exact time that 
the command was generated. It is sent as the number of seconds since the standard UNIX 
epoch. This line is then digitally signed using client_x_private.key, base 64 encoded, and 
added to the headers as the authsign. The Authline header itself is checked to make sure 
that the Command, To, and From values is appropriate. The timestamp is verified to be 
within some close value to the current time in order to prevent a replay attack. 
Privacy 
The main function of most popular peer-to-peer networks is to share files. This precludes 
the need for message privacy. It is possible in a backup network that certain data my not 
necessarily need to be encrypted, for instance if the backup included general operating 
system files. However, symmetric encryption is much less computationally intensive than 
is asymmetric encryption, and this project encrypts all data by default. Each client can 
independently choose its own private key and encryption method without regard to what 
other peers on the network do. The current implementation generates a private key and 
uses the Triple Des encryption function to encrypt all data. The private key is never 
shared with any other peer or server authority. 
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Conclusion 
Research in P2P networking has provided an assortment of techniques useful for 
distributed applications. Complex ideas have been proposed that enable security, 
reputation management, anonymity, advanced key-mapping, etc. A P2P backup network 
can utilize some of these, while others pose no suitable advantage. Convergent encryption 
facilitates privacy and also sharing of redundant files. In order to insure data integrity 
stored on foreign peers, challenges that utilize cryptographic hashes can be used while 
minimizing bandwidth. Structured networks based on distributed hash tables can be 
successfully utilized for storing metadata, but may not be suited for the actual data 
storage itself.  
Decentralized systems are ideal in order to minimize administration, but greatly increase 
the complexity of the network, and implementing reputation schemes or micropayments, 
identity management, authentication, and peer lookup become difficult without central 
servers. Centralized networks offer more robust methods of authentication, reliability, 
and discovery of trading partners, but may be overkill in an era of extremely inexpensive 
and reliable online storage services.  
P2P backup schemes are becoming less likely due to several factors. Backup networks 
that utilize the storage space of network peers can never insure the reliability that most 
users would assume and require. Personal backup hardware has become more user-
friendly and online storage services such as S3 [8] and Streamload [9] offer rates much 
lower than those used to justify P2P backup in past research. Finally, the increase in 
energy costs and more aggressive power management techniques are antagonistic to 
networks that rely on high uptimes of peer nodes. 
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